STANDING, EQUITY, AN D INJURY IN FACT
Ernest A. Young*
This contribution to the Notre Dame Law Review’s annual Federal Courts
Symposium on “The Nature of the Federal Equity Power” asks what the traditions of
equity can tell us about Article III standing. I take as my point of departure the
observation by Professors Sam Bray and Paul Miller, in their contribution to the
Symposium, that equity does not have causes of action as such—or at least not in the
same way as actions at law. This is potentially important for standing, as many
academic critiques of the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence have argued that
standing should turn on whether the plaintiff has a cause of action. If Article III
standing is to reflect traditional notions of which disputes are appropriate for judicial
resolution, however, then that inquiry should include traditional practice on the equity
side of the house, not just on the law side. I conclude that an equitable “grievance”—
which Bray and Miller suggest plays a parallel role in equity to causes of action at
law—typically involves a more particularized set of circumstances involving concrete
harm or unfairness to the plaintiff. Equitable grievance, in other words, looks a lot
like injury in fact. Attention to traditional equity practice thus may help put the Court's
much-maligned injury-in-fact jurisprudence on a firmer footing.

Most American lawyers, I suspect, know far too little about equity.
We know that once upon a time, back in Merry Olde England, there
were separate law and equity courts, but we also know that American
jurisdictions have generally fused these two separate strands of law.
Article III, after all, extended the federal judicial power to “all Cases,
in Law and Equity,”1 and since 1938 the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have proclaimed that “[t]here is one form of action—the
civil action.”2 And so it has seemed safe to treat equity’s traditions as
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largely anachronistic and its complexities as not worth plumbing.3
That is true even among many of us who focus on procedure,
jurisdiction, and remedies for a living.4
This neglect of equity and its distinctive qualities and traditions is
surely a mistake. Sam Bray’s work insists that “there has been a partial
fusion of law and equity,”5 and Kellen Funk’s historical study of fusion
notes that “American jurisprudence to this day continues to rely on the
traditional categories to determine whether certain rights or remedies
are available to litigants.”6 Even scholars who stress the integration of
law and equity point to equity’s continuing importance. As Doug
Laycock puts it, “[t]he distinctive traditions of equity now pervade the
legal system. The war between law and equity is over. Equity won.”7 It
is past time the non-equity-specialists paid more attention.
In that spirit, my contribution to this Symposium explores what
the federal law of standing can learn from equity’s distinctive
traditions. Standing law does take account of equity in certain ways.
That law largely accepts a connection between justiciability, the merits,
and remedies.8 A plaintiff’s injury in fact, necessary to satisfy Article
III, must not only be traceable to the defendant’s conduct but also
redressable by the requested relief9—thus necessitating an inquiry into
what relief may be available. And separation of powers or federalism
concerns familiar to remedies law—such as whether a court should
interfere with the enforcement discretion of executive officials or
3 See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Equity: Notes on the American Reception, in EQUITY AND LAW:
FUSION AND FISSION 31, 38 (John C.P. Goldberg, Henry E. Smith & P.G. Turner eds., 2019)
(“Equity has not been offered as a course in most American law schools since the 1960s.
The basic terminology and conceptual content of equity are unfamiliar to generations of
students.”); Andrew Kull, Equity’s Atrophy, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1801, 1805 (2022) (“For
half a century, students have been going through U.S. law schools without hearing anything
said about equity—other than the assurance that references to ‘equity’ in the older cases,
having become obsolete, can be safely ignored.”).
4 In case it is not already clear, I offer these observations not as a pointing of the
finger but as a confession of guilt.
5 Bray, supra note 3, at 38 (emphasis added).
6 Kellen Funk, Equity Without Chancery: The Fusion of Law and Equity in the Field Code
of Civil Procedure, New York 1846–76, 36 J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 191 (2015); see also Bray, supra
note 3, at 38 (“US courts, both federal and state, continue to make sharp distinctions
between legal and equitable remedies.”).
7 Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53 (1993); see
also Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
8 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—
and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 661 (2006) (concluding that
“the thesis that justiciability doctrines are deeply influenced by concerns about judicial
remedies seems almost self-evidently true”).
9 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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engage in ongoing supervision of state institutions—have often
migrated forward to shape a court’s view of the plaintiff’s standing at
the threshold of litigation.10 Both individual jurists and commentators
have sharply criticized the use of remedial law to shape standing,11 but
unless standing doctrine becomes a great deal more formalist than it
currently is—a change few advocate—the cross-pollination of standing
and remedies seems inevitable.
Equity has been curiously absent, however, from more
foundational debates about standing’s basic requirements.
In
particular, debates over the legitimacy and nature of the injury-in-fact
requirement largely proceed as if all plaintiffs assert claims for legal
relief. Hence, critics of the injury-in-fact requirement generally argue
that courts assessing a plaintiff’s standing should ask simply whether
the plaintiff has a legal cause of action.12 But Sam Bray and Paul Miller
argue in this Symposium that causes of action are simply not a thing in
equity.13 If that is true, then it makes little sense to structure the
Court’s general standing jurisprudence, supposed to apply to legal and
equitable claims alike, around the existence of a legal cause of action.
After all, the overwhelming majority of cases that have shaped the
Court’s contemporary standing jurisprudence have involved claims for
equitable relief.
This Essay takes as its starting point Professors Bray and Miller’s
observation that equity did not traditionally require a “cause of
action.” Instead, they say, equity focuses on a “grievance” that can
motivate the court to intervene.14 The precise meaning of an equitable
grievance is not easy to pin down, but it does seem clear that it has less
to do with legal rights to sue than with specific factual circumstances
involving loss or unfairness to the plaintiff. Equity’s general mission,
after all, is often characterized as filling the gap arising when abstract

10 See, e.g., id. at 759–60 (separation of powers); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499–
501 (1974) (federalism).
11 See, e.g., O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 510 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“I would cross the bridge
of remedies only when the precise contours of the problem have been established after a
trial.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23 (1984).
12 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 290–91
(1988); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 177 (1992).
13 See Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, Getting into Equity, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1763, 1764 (2022) (“Having a cause of action was how a plaintiff would get into a court of
law, but to get into equity, a plaintiff needed something quite different.”).
14 Id. at 1772–75.
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legal rights fail to provide relief in particular, compelling
circumstances.15
Equitable grievances, I submit, look a lot like injury in fact. To
the extent that Court’s standing jurisprudence defines Article III’s
requirements in line with traditional practice,16 longstanding practice
in equity may provide a firmer ground for injury in fact than does
traditional practice on the law side of the house. The injury-in-factrequirement for standing may be, in other words, further evidence of
the “triumph of equity” that Professor Laycock has noted.17 At a
minimum, scholars of standing need to know a good deal more about
equity.
I.

THE DEBATE OVER INJURY IN FACT

The “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing under
Article III is an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.18 This
requirement, while commanding the apparent assent of all recent
Justices on the Supreme Court,19 has long been under siege by
academics20 and, occasionally, lower court jurists.21 Even if one doubts
that any of this criticism is likely to persuade the Court to abandon the
last half century of its standing jurisprudence, deepening our
understanding of the injury-in-fact requirement may help answer
unresolved questions concerning its contemporary application. In
particular, the current Court remains divided over the ability of a
“purely legal” injury to serve as injury in fact, and important cases

15 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. 1050, 1067–71, 1081–84
(2021).
16 See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774
(2000).
17 See Laycock, supra note 7.
18 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
19 See, e.g., Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 797 (2021) (Justice Thomas,
writing for eight Justices); id. at 802–03 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a remaining
claim for nominal damages is insufficient injury to preserve the plaintiff’s personal stake in
the litigation).
20 See, e.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 501–07
(2008); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742 (1999);
Sunstein, supra note 12, at 222–23.
21 See, e.g., Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F.3d 1110, 1117 (11th Cir. 2021)
(Newsom, J., concurring) (“In deciding cases in the wake of Spokeo, I’ve come to the view—
reluctantly, but decidedly—that our Article III standing jurisprudence has jumped the
tracks.”).
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raising that question continue to press for the Court’s attention.22
Doctrinal controversy now focuses on what counts as injury, rather than
whether injury should be required—but either way we still need to
clarify the meaning of the concept.
The distinctive traditions of equity can help deepen our
understanding of these issues. But it may help to begin by clarifying
the Court’s conception of injury in fact, how it arose, and why it
remains controversial.
A. The Movement from Legal to Factual Injury
Our leading scholar of the cause of action, A.J. Bellia, has written
that “[a]t common law, there was no doctrine of standing per se. A
case was justiciable if a plaintiff had a cause of action for a remedy
under one of the forms of proceeding at law or in equity.”23 Likewise,
cases concerning the justiciability of a plaintiff’s claims during the
nineteenth century focused on the legal merits—that is, whether the
relevant common or statutory law provided the right kind of legal right
or entitlement to review.24 By the first half of the twentieth century,
American courts were speaking in terms of “standing” and requiring
either (1) that the plaintiff fell within the terms of a statute creating a
right to judicial review25 or (2) that plaintiffs alleged “‘an invasion of
recognized legal rights’ . . . that the law conferred upon the plaintiff in
particular.”26 As before, focus was on the presence of a legal right to
sue—either by virtue of the invasion of a legally protected interest or

22 See generally William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP. CT. REV.
197. In TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), the Court divided over whether
Congress could create private rights by statute such that their violation would be sufficient
for injury in fact, without a further showing of actual damages. Compare id. at 2207 & n.3
(rejecting this proposition), with id. at 2217–18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
violation of a private right satisfies the injury requirement), and id. at 2226 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “concrete injury” is necessary even for legal violations, but stating
that any difference from Justice Thomas’s position was “unlikely to make much difference
in practice”). This is not the place to parse these distinctions. The point is that, as Justice
Thomas’s recitation of the injury-in-fact requirement for the Uzuegbunam majority makes
clear, see 141 S. Ct. at 797, these are simply disagreements about the precise meaning of
injury in fact in close cases.
23 Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 817
(2004).
24 See Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1136–
39 (2009); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102
MICH. L. REV. 689, 712–18 (2004).
25 See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
26 Caleb Nelson, “Standing” and Remedial Rights in Administrative Law, 105 VA. L. REV.
703, 716 (2019) (quoting Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940)).
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specific conferral of a right to sue by Congress.27 Scholars have argued
over whether plaintiffs in this era generally also had to demonstrate a
factual injury,28 but this was not the focus of the operative legal test for
standing.29
All this changed with the Supreme Court’s 1970 decision in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.30 That
case loosened considerably the requirement that plaintiffs show a
cause of action or cognizable legal interest, instead asking only that
they fall “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated” by the substantive laws they invoke.31 At the same time,
however, Data Processing required an “injury in fact, economic or
otherwise.”32 The result, as Craig Stern has explained, was that
“[w]hereas standing used to require that the plaintiff have suffered an
injury that gave rise to a cause of action, an injury at law, the present
standing is said to require only injury-in-fact, some harm to the plaintiff
not necessarily tantamount to legal injury.”33
One can best understand the shift from legal to factual injury
against the background of changing relationships between courts, the
executive agencies, Congress, and different sorts of private litigants.34
American courts began to develop a distinct doctrine of standing in
the early twentieth century, as progressive jurists like Louis Brandeis
and Felix Frankfurter sought to insulate the nascent regulatory state

27 See Magill, supra note 24, at 1135–36.
28 Compare, e.g., id. at 1133 (asserting that during the mid-twentieth century “Congress
was allowed to authorize legal challenges to government action by parties whose only
cognizable interest was . . . that the government abide by the law”), with Woolhandler &
Nelson, supra note 24, at 701–02 (arguing that private parties suing for violations of public
rights still had to show “special damage”).
29 See Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a
Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Federal Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169,
1177 (2008) (observing that “[a] colorable claim of direct injury was subsumed within the
cause of action,” but that factual injury “would not supply standing apart from a cause of
action”).
30 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
31 Id. at 153.
32 Id. at 152.
33 Stern, supra note 29, at 1171. One can accept Professor Stern’s account of a shift
from legal to factual injury without equating legal injury with possession of a cause of action.
See infra text accompanying notes 99–107.
34 Curt Bradley and I have sketched this story in somewhat more detail elsewhere. See
Curtis A. Bradley & Ernest A. Young, Unpacking Third-Party Standing, 131 YALE L.J. 1, 10–13
(2021); see also Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine?
An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591 (2010)
(complicating the conventional story with empirical analysis of standing decisions over
time).
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from legal challenge.35 A strict requirement of legal injury fit well with
efforts to limit challenges by regulated entities, which would generally
be able to show factual costs from government action but often lacked
either protected legal interests or established rights to sue.36
As battles over the New Deal receded into memory, however,
progressives began to worry more about agency capture than legal
challenge; they thus wanted to empower regulatory beneficiaries to use
courts to force agencies to vigorously pursue the goals of progressive
legislation.37 Data Processing’s shift to a more permissive test of legal
entitlement—the “zone of interests” test—tended to open the federal
courts to these sorts of suits even when Congress had not acted to
specifically authorize such suits.38 Data Processing thus helped to foster
a “public rights” model of adjudication, which featured plaintiffs in
“public actions” asserting “broad and diffuse interests—such as those
of consumers or users of the ‘environment’—which do not involve the
litigants’ individual status.”39
At the same time, however, the Court was retreating from the full
implications of the public rights model by insisting on injury in fact as
a constitutional prerequisite for standing.40 As noted already, the
injury-in-fact requirement appeared in Data Processing itself, but its
potential to restrict public law litigation may not have been apparent
before cases like Sierra Club v. Morton41 in 1972 and Warth v. Seldin42 in
1975. Morton made clear that a public interest organization like the
Sierra Club could not assert standing to sue simply by virtue of its

35 See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); see also Sunstein, supra note 12, at 179.
36 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 180; Magill, supra note 24, at 1136–39.
37 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 183–84.
38 See 397 U.S. at 153–54 (1970) (indicating that the Court was following “the
trend . . . toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative
action”); Nelson, supra note 26, at 763–65; Kenneth Culp Davis, The Liberalized Law of
Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 452–53 (1970) (characterizing Data Processing as
liberalizing standing).
39 Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1369 (1973); see also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 281–318
(1990); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
40 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); see also Magill, supra note 24, at 1134
(“While the Supreme Court and lower courts did expand standing in important respects
between the middle of the 1960s and the 1970s, they simultaneously retreated from the
standing for the public approach of the previous decades.”).
41 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (denying standing to the Sierra Club to challenge land use
decisions by federal officials concerning National Forest land).
42 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (denying standing to a group of plaintiffs challenging allegedly
exclusionary zoning measures in a Rochester, New York suburb).
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concern for the public interest without alleging a more particular
injury.43 And Warth highlighted the injury principle’s related
requirements of causation and redressability.44 At least in hindsight,
Morton and Warth should have signaled that injury in fact could pose a
significant hurdle to public law litigants, especially when those litigants
were beneficiaries of regulation rather than its objects.45
Warth’s restrictions may have seemed of secondary importance at
the time, however, because Congress had begun to enact broad citizensuit provisions in statutes protecting the environment, consumer
safety, and other broad progressive interests.46 Those provisions
purported to empower plaintiffs to sue without regard to any particular
injury to their own personal interests.47 If, as in the mid-twentiethcentury era, statutory authorization provided a free pass to standing
without regard to legal or factual injury,48 then the public action could
thrive notwithstanding the Court’s injury-in-fact requirement. That
hope seemed dashed, however, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,49 which
the Court decided in 1992.50 And it became clear that injury in fact
was a freestanding constitutional requirement—not a complementary
avenue to establishing standing for those lacking a statutory
entitlement to sue.51
43 See 405 U.S. at 734–35 (insisting that “the ‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an
injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among
the injured”).
44 See 422 U.S. at 504–05.
45 See, e.g., 422 U.S. at 504–08 (stating that “the indirectness of the injury . . . may
make it substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirements of Art. III” and
holding that the injury in question was too indirect to support standing). For other early
cases demonstrating the restrictive potential of Data Processing’s injury-in-fact requirement,
see, for example, Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973).
46 See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Citizen Litigants Citizen Regulators: Four Cases Where Citizen
Suits Drove Development of Clean Water Law, 25 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 61,
64–67 (2014) (describing the rise of environmental citizen suits under the Clean Air and
Water Acts).
47 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2018) (Clean Air Act provision empowering “any
person” to “commence a civil action on his own behalf”).
48 See Magill, supra note 24, at 1139.
49 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
50 It is worth noting that the Court had said that an express statutory right of action
could not override Article III’s injury requirement in dicta going all the way back to Warth
itself. See 422 U.S. at 501. But Lujan was the first case in which the Court actually held
unconstitutional an effort to grant statutory standing to a broad class of litigants without
regard to personal injury. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 165.
51 See Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F.3d 1110, 1118 (11th Cir. 2021)
(Newsom, J., concurring).
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Three decades after Lujan, scholars writing about standing,52 as
well as some scholarly judges,53 remain highly critical of the injury-infact requirement. Many of these critics worried that injury in fact
would cripple public law litigation, but in retrospect it seems clear that
the Court has never set the bar for injury in fact particularly high.54
More compelling criticisms assert that injury in fact lacks much of a
historical pedigree, while others stress ambiguities and inconsistencies
in the test’s application.55 The next Section suggests that closer
attention to equitable practice might help answer at least some of these
concerns.
B. The Court’s Historical Standing Test
The development of standing doctrine has featured three primary
forms of argument: separation-of-powers arguments about judicial
power vis-à-vis the political branches,56 prudential considerations about
the optimal conditions for judicial decisionmaking,57 and historical
arguments. In that third vein, the Supreme Court has said that “Article
III’s restriction of the judicial power to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ is
properly understood to mean ‘cases and controversies of the sort
traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’”58 An
Article III “case” or “controversy” has been defined operationally, in

52 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Injury In Fact, Transformed (March 11, 2022)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review); F. Andrew Hessick,
Understanding Standing, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 195, 196 (2015); Elliott, supra note 20, at
468.
53 See, e.g., Sierra, 996 F.3d at 1117 (Newsom, J., concurring); Muransky v. Godiva
Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917, 973–85 (11th Cir. 2020) (Jordan, J., dissenting).
54 See Bradley & Young, supra note 34, at 13–14.
55 On the historical point, see, for example, Sunstein, supra note 12, at 168–97 and F.
Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 299–
300 (2008). But see generally Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 24, at 691 (rejecting
historical critiques of current standing doctrine). For arguments that the injury-in-fact rule
has produced incoherent and confusing doctrine, see, for example, Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 69–70 (1984) and Hessick, supra, at 276.
56 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Art. III standing
is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”).
57 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (“The requirement of ‘actual injury redressable by the
court’ . . . tends to assure that the legal questions presented . . . will be resolved, not in the
rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a
realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976)).
58 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000)
(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)).
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other words, by reference to the sorts of cases traditionally heard in
Anglo-American courts.59
This formulation masks an important ambiguity concerning
how—or when—we might seek the traditional or historical meaning of
Article III’s references to “cases,” “controversies,” and “judicial
power.”60 A typical originalist inquiry would look to the original public
meaning of those terms in 1789, without much attention to how those
terms might have come to be understood by subsequent generations.
That approach is well-established under the Seventh Amendment’s
civil jury trial guarantee, for example, which specifically “preserve[s]”
“the right of trial by jury” in “[s]uits at common law.”61 But Article III
lacks any parallel language suggesting a specific intent to freeze legal
practice at a particular time.
Important aspects of our constitutional law governing procedure
have been interpreted according to a different notion of history and
tradition—that is, a survey of longstanding historical practice over the
course of our history, and not just at the moment when the relevant
constitutional provision was adopted. In Burnham v. Superior Court of
California,62 for example, Justice Scalia interpreted the FourteenthAmendment Due Process Clause’s limit on personal jurisdiction by
looking not only to practice in 1868 but also English common-law
practice, state practice from the eighteenth through the early
twentieth centuries, as well as continuing contemporary practice.63
59 See Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive and Entrenchment
Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535, 572 (2016)
(“Federal courts law incorporates the English common law and equitable practice . . . as a
pragmatic solution to the generality of the Article III judicial power and its instantiation in
the various judiciary acts.”).
60 See, e.g., id. at 549 (noting that “the law of federal courts has frequently relied on
both historical practice that long predates the Constitution . . . and that developed
considerably after ratification”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History
in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1755–56 (2015) (describing a
variety of uses for history besides ascertaining the original understanding of text).
61 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
370, 376 (1996) (“Since Justice Story’s day . . . we have understood that ‘[t]he right of trial
by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English common law when the
Amendment was adopted.’”) (quoting Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S.
654, 657 (1935)). Seventh Amendment opinions thus ask “whether we are dealing with a
cause of action that either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least analogous
to one that was.” Id.
62 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
63 See id. at 609–16 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.); see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 733 (1878) (stating that due process “mean[s] a course of legal proceedings according
to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence
for the protection and enforcement of private rights”). The Justices in Burnham divided
over whether the test should be wholly one of historical tradition or whether contemporary
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That sort of history derives its force “not so much from the status of
politicians and judges closely associated with the Founding itself but
rather from the weight of longstanding usage over time.”64
Although the debate over Article III standing has occasionally
looked to the Founders’ understanding of eighteenth-century English
practice, scholars and judges have not confined themselves to that
narrow time frame.65 Good reasons exist, moreover, to stress the
evolution of American practice rather than an eighteenth-century
snapshot of how English practice might have looked to the Framers.
The Founding generation was highly ambivalent about receiving the
common law en masse66 and even more ambivalent about receiving
English equity.67 They were building a federal republic with both state
and federal judiciaries, while constructing a federal judiciary that
combined the functions of the English law, equity, and admiralty
courts.68 The judiciary Article, moreover, was the least fleshed out at
ratification. The “Madisonian Compromise,” for instance, left it to
notions of fairness should play a role, see 495 U.S. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment), but no Justice urged a different, more originalist approach to defining the
historical tradition.
64 Young, supra note 59, at 549–50.
65 See, e.g., Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 798–99 (2021) (considering the
approach of courts “both before and after ratification of the Constitution” to nominal
damages); id. at 805 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (acknowledging that “[w]e should of course
consult founding-era decisions” to discern how the terms “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies”
“were understood at the time,” but insisting that standing must also conform to the evolving
understanding “of an independent Judiciary” as reflected in more recent doctrine);
Sunstein, supra note 12, at 168–79 (offering a “[c]apsule [h]istory” of English and
American practice from the pre-Founding era through the nineteenth century).
66 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 131–42 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the caution with which the Founders both adopted and adapted the
common law); Richard C. Dale, The Adoption of the Common Law by the American Colonies, 30
AM. L. REG. 553, 554 (1882) (noting that aspects of the common law “which existed under
the English political organization, or [were] based upon the triple relation of king, lords
and commons, or those peculiar social conditions, habits and customs which have no
counterpart in the New World . . . were never recognised as part of [the colonists’]
jurisprudence”).
67 See, e.g., Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and
Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 266–68 (2010); id. at 268 (“[T]he
deviations in America from the established principles of equity were far more considerable
than from those of the common law.”) (quoting Joseph Story, An Address Delivered Before
the Members of the Suffolk Bar, at Their Anniversary (Sept. 4, 1821), in 1 AM. JURIST 1, 22
(Freeman & Bolles, Boston 1829)).
68 See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 24, at 692 (“In favoring a private-injury
requirement for private litigation, [early American courts’] decisions were influenced by
American ideas about the proper role of the judiciary, its relationship to the political
branches of the state and federal governments, and the legitimate allocations of public and
private power.”).
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Congress whether to create lower federal courts at all,69 and the early
statutes governing procedure and remedies began by incorporating
state practice and only gradually carved out a role for distinctive
federal rules.70 Kristin Collins thus concludes that, “[a]s with much of
the design of the federal judicial system, the details of the federal
courts’ equity powers were left to Congress and the Supreme Court to
resolve.”71 And she notes that this resolution was gradual and did not
simply incorporate English practice.72
At the end of the day, no one expects to find the injury-in-fact test,
as presently constructed, lurking somewhere in The Federalist Papers or
Madison’s notes on the Philadelphia debates. That test is a doctrinal
construction designed to implement the meaning of Article III.73 The
question is whether the injury-in-fact test is well-grounded in
traditional understandings of the sorts of lawsuits that appropriately
may be brought in court. One would think, however, that traditional
practice in equity would be relevant to defining the contours of an
Article III case alongside traditional practice with respect to legal
claims. Any appreciation of equity practice as meaningfully distinctive
is, however, largely missing from contemporary debates about
standing.
II.

INJURY IN FACT AND EQUITABLE GRIEVANCE

Historical inquiries into the traditional predicates for a lawsuit
have tended either to focus only on the law side of the house or at least
to overlook the senses in which equity is meaningfully distinctive.
Judge Newsom’s thoughtful and learned treatment, for instance, does
not discuss equity as a separate category of cases potentially posing
different requirements than a traditional legal cause of action.74
Discussions of standing generally have considered equitable practice

69 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 296 (7th
ed. 2015) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
70 See Collins, supra note 67, at 259–74.
71 Id. at 269.
72 See id. at 267–74.
73 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV.
54, 62 (1997) (arguing that doctrinal tests necessarily cannot be derived simply from the
meaning of the constitutional norms that they implement).
74 Judge Newsom does briefly discuss public nuisance—an equitable genre—and
acknowledges that those cases did traditionally require “some special injury” analogous to
injury in fact. See Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F.3d 1110, 1126 (11th Cir. 2021)
(Newsom, J., concurring) (quoting Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 91, 98–99 (1838)).
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in only a particular way, focused on redressability, and they have
overlooked the implications of equity’s unique history for the more
foundational issue of injury in fact.
A. Equitable Limitations on Redressability
The redressability cases have two themes. One concern is that
equitable relief might be ineffectual. It may seem futile to uphold
plaintiffs’ standing to litigate a claim when it is obvious, even at the
outset of a case, that the plaintiff will ultimately fail to satisfy the
requirements for the equitable relief they seek. Giving plaintiffs the
opportunity to develop their case before requiring them to meet the
requirements for equitable relief may avoid a premature conclusion
that they cannot do so,75 but it also subjects the defendant (and the
court) to years of expensive and potentially intrusive litigation (and
imposes corresponding pressures to settle the case) in what may
ultimately be a lost cause. Courts have articulated these concerns
under the rubric of whether the plaintiff’s claim is “likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.”76 Injunctive relief can’t redress your
claim, the argument goes, if you’re unlikely to get it at the end of the
case.77 Or the court may conclude that an injunction may not solve the
plaintiff’s problem. Where redressing the plaintiff’s injury would
depend on actions by third parties not before the court, for example,
an injunction against the defendant might be insufficient to establish
redressability.78
The second, and possibly more persuasive, aspect concerns the
impact of equitable relief upon other values—typically, constitutional
values of separation of powers or federalism.79 The lawsuit in Allen v.
Wright,80 for example, sought an injunction to compel the Internal
75 See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 511 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (insisting
that “whether the Federal District Court in the exercise of its equitable discretion could
frame suitable relief [is], of course, [a] question[] which can be answered only after a trial
on the merits”).
76 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
77 This intuition makes a certain amount of sense, but “likely to be redressed by the
requested relief” is subject to at least one obvious alternative interpretation. That is, it
might well refer not to whether the requested relief is likely to be granted if the plaintiff
prevails on the merits, but rather to whether the relief is likely to redress the plaintiff’s
injury if it is granted.
78 See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 43–44 (1976) (denying
standing in part on the ground that an injunction to a government official to deny favorable
tax treatment to hospitals not treating indigent persons would not necessarily make services
available to those persons).
79 See Fallon, supra note 8, at 649–52.
80 468 U.S. 737.
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Revenue Service to step up its efforts to identify and disqualify from
charitable status private schools that engaged in covert discrimination
against racial minorities. This raised a separation of powers concern
about second-guessing the agency’s enforcement discretion;81 after all,
the IRS might have concluded that it had already acted upon those
instances of private school discrimination that could be readily
identified, and further enforcement efforts would yield diminishing
returns and trade off with other enforcement priorities.
Likewise, in a variety of cases, the Court has invoked federalism
concerns in rejecting standing for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief
that would include intrusive judicial monitoring of state or local
prisons, courts, or police institutions.82 In O’Shea v. Littleton,83 for
example, the Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek an
injunction providing for federal monitoring of charging practices in
state criminal courts. Standing considerations, the Court said,
“obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint states
a sound basis for equitable relief.”84 The Court saw the requested relief
as “nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal
proceedings” that would undermine values of comity and federalism.85
These sorts of concerns have caused the Court not only to deny
standing altogether but also, in some cases, to limit the scope of
injunctive relief that plaintiffs have standing to seek.86
B. Causes of Action and Equitable Grievances
What neither the cases nor the academic literature have done, so
far as I can tell, is explore how equitable traditions might differ from
legal ones with respect to the foundational preconditions for a suit. If
equitable preconditions do differ—as Professors Bray and Miller say
they do—then that difference ought to inform efforts to interpret
81 See id. at 759–61.
82 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 385 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (warning
that “[p]rinciples of federalism and separation of powers impose stringent limitations on
the equitable power of federal courts,” and that “Article III cannot be understood to
authorize the Federal Judiciary to take control of core state institutions like prisons, schools,
and hospitals, and assume responsibility for making the difficult policy judgments that state
officials are both constitutionally entitled and uniquely qualified to make”).
83 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
84 Id. at 499.
85 Id. at 500 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)); see also City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (“[R]ecognition of the need for a proper balance between
state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state
officers engaged in the administration of the States’ criminal laws in the absence of
irreparable injury which is both great and immediate.”).
86 See, e.g., Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349–53, 353 n.3.
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Article III’s “irreducible constitutional minimum” for standing. In
particular, that difference matters with respect to whether the “injuryin-fact” test can be justified and whether it ought to be replaced with a
test focusing on whether the plaintiff has a legal cause of action.
Professors Bray and Miller argue that “causes of action” do not
traditionally exist in equity, at least in the sense that current discussions
mainly use that term.87 They differentiate between three senses of a
“cause of action”: (1) “to be able to plead . . . the various elements
required” for a successful lawsuit; (2) “a legal entitlement to sue”; and
(3) a less technical meaning based on a reason that will motivate a
court to act and provide relief—that is, a “cause for acting.”88 The first
of these senses predominated in the early years before courts typically
spoke in terms of “standing” at all. The second—“cause of action” as
a legal entitlement to sue, whether granted by statute, implied by
courts, or derived from common law—predominates now. It largely
overlaps with the pre-Data Processing “legal injury” test, and it is what
critics of the injury-in-fact requirement seem to mean when they say
standing should require only a cause of action. Bray and Miller argue,
however, that equity requires a cause of action only in the third sense—
that is, a reason for a court to issue a remedy.89
Professors Bray and Miller are not entirely pellucid about the
difference between their second and third senses of a cause of action—
that is, between “a legal entitlement to sue” and a “cause for acting”
that will prompt a court to issue equitable relief.90 The key to an
equitable “cause for acting,” they say, is “a grievance.”91 By that they
mean “a complaint rooted in interpersonal interactions that are
governed by law,” amounting to “a challenge to the law’s routine
administration or enforcement.”92 In this sense, an equitable
grievance is quite different from a legal cause of action. Equity
responds, in theory, to the gaps in the regular remedies available at law.
One might have an equitable grievance precisely because one lacks a
regular, well-established legal cause of action.

87 See Bray & Miller, supra note 13, at 1770–72; see also Aditya Bamzai & Samuel L.
Bray, Debs and the Federal Equity Power 27 (Oct. 30, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the Notre Dame Law Review) (pointing out that “[e]quity . . . does not have ‘causes
of action’ as a constraint on suits”).
88 Bray & Miller, supra note 13, at 1774–75.
89 See id. at 1777.
90 For another effort to explain the difference along similar lines, see P.G. Turner,
Fusion and Theories of Equity in Common Law Systems, in EQUITY AND LAW, supra note 3, at 1,
19–21.
91 Bray & Miller, supra note 13, at 1774–75.
92 Id. at 1777.

1900

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:5

Not everyone seems to agree that causes of action are simply not
a thing in equity, and knowledgeable people do sometimes speak of
equitable causes of action.93
As Professors Bray and Miller
acknowledge, “[o]ver time, with doctrinal development, some . . .
[equitable] grievances have become standardized so as to be roughly
equivalent to civil wrongs.”94 And we have merged law and equity, even
if that merger is incomplete in important respects. As a result, we have
statutes that both create causes of action in the legal sense and provide
for equitable relief.95 Some of these statutes purport to provide for
equitable relief on behalf of plaintiffs who need show—at least as a
statutory matter—no particular injury in fact of their own.96 In such
cases, the Court’s standing jurisprudence nonetheless requires a
showing of injury in fact notwithstanding Congress’s intention to
confer rights to sue more broadly.97 Bray and Miller do not discuss
standing, but they might consider this requirement salutary because it
tends to reinstate equity’s traditional distinctiveness and particularity
even in contexts where statutory law forces equity and law together.98
It may help to consider two relatively familiar scenarios in which
one might have an equitable grievance without a legal injury or cause
of action. The first is FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,99 in which a
radio station challenged the FCC’s grant of a license to a company that
wished to create a competing radio station. The case illustrates that
the “legal injury” required in traditional standing cases is not identical
with the legal cause of action upon which contemporary scholars

93 See, e.g., John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1014 n.100 (2008)
(“Anti-suit injunctions, by providing affirmative relief on the basis of legal advantages that
otherwise would be asserted as defenses, are not just an equitable remedy but an equitable
cause of action.”); Bellia, supra note 23, at 817 (stating that “[a] case was justiciable if a
plaintiff had a cause of action for a remedy under one of the forms of proceeding at law or
in equity”) (emphasis added).
94 Bray & Miller, supra note 13, at 1777–78. Professors Bray and Miller insist, however,
that “most of the grievances that equity would hear have not been formalized as civil wrongs.
Here, exercising its older function, evincing its primordial function, equity channels
discretionary corrective intervention in the enforcement of law. A suit in ‘corrective equity’
is paradigmatically about a grievance, not about a liability for a wrong.” Id. at 1777.
95 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2018) (providing for injunctive relief in private
suits alleging unlawful employment practices under Title VII); Harrison, supra note 93, at
1014 n.100 (“Equity often provides additional remedies where the law already provides an
entitlement to affirmative relief, a cause of action.”).
96 See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,
61–62 (1987) (construing the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act).
97 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).
98 See Bray & Miller, supra note 13, at 1774–76 (bemoaning the conflating of equitable
grievances with causes of action).
99 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
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would ground federal standing requirements.100 Sanders Brothers had
an injury in fact (probable economic injury arising from new
competition), but the Court made clear that this was not a legal injury
under the Communications Act, which provided no right to be free
from competition.101 Nonetheless, the Court found that Sanders
Brothers had a cause of action under the Communications Act, which
permitted “any . . . person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely
affected by any decision of the Commission” to seek judicial review of
those orders.102 Given that the plaintiff sued under the Act to
invalidate the license, the Court had no occasion to consider whether
the plaintiff’s factual injury would be sufficient to support more
traditional equitable relief.103
What about an equitable grievance without a legal cause of action?
The Roberts Court’s discussion in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center,
Inc.104 would seem to provide a good example. In that case, providers
of healthcare services covered by Medicaid sued officials of the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare, arguing that Idaho had violated a
provision of the Medicaid statute by reimbursing the providers at rates
lower than federal law requires.105 The plaintiffs clearly had a legal
injury—they were legally entitled to the higher rate—and they sought
an injunction requiring the State to increase its reimbursement rates.106
The district court granted the injunction and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs had “an implied right of action
under the Supremacy Clause to seek injunctive relief” under these
circumstances.107 The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the notion
that the Supremacy Clause creates causes of action of any kind.108
But—crucially for our purposes—the Court said that this lack of a
cause of action did not necessarily mean that a federal court could not
grant equitable relief.109

100 See also Bradley & Young, supra note 34, at 32–34 (discussing how possessing a legal
interest under a particular legal provision, as captured by the “zone of interests” test, is
distinct from having a legal cause of action).
101 See 309 U.S. at 473–76.
102 See id. at 476–77 (construing 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1940)).
103 Cf. Laycock, supra note 7, at 67 (pointing out that much of our administrative law
is closer to equity than to legal models).
104 575 U.S. 320 (2015).
105 Id. at 323–24.
106 Id. at 324.
107 Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc. v. Armstrong, 567 F. App’x. 496, 497 (9th Cir. 2014).
108 See 575 U.S. at 324–25 (“It is . . . apparent that the Supremacy Clause is not the
‘“source of any federal rights,”’ . . . and certainly does not create a cause of action.”)
(quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989)).
109 Id. at 326–27.
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In discussing a possible equitable remedy in Armstrong, Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion scrupulously avoided using the term “cause
of action.”110 The Court acknowledged that “we have long held that
federal courts may in some circumstances grant injunctive relief
against state officers who are violating, or planning to violate, federal
law,”111 citing the landmark decisions in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States112 and Ex parte Young.113 “What [these] cases demonstrate,” the
Court explained, “is that, ‘in a proper case, relief may be given in a
court of equity . . . to prevent an injurious act by a public officer.’”114
The Court elaborated:
The ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and
federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long
history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to
England. . . . It is a judge-made remedy, and we have never held or
even suggested that, in its application to state officers, it rests upon
an implied right of action contained in the Supremacy Clause.
That is because . . . it does not.115

What does the remedy in such cases rest upon? Armstrong did not
say. The Court rejected one possibility, which is that a “cause of
action” could be implied under “the Medicaid Act itself.”116 That was
hardly surprising, given the Court’s general aversion to implying rights
of action under federal statutes in recent years.117 But this holding
foreclosed the most obvious alternative in such cases to an implied
right under the Supremacy Clause—that is, an implied right of action
under whatever statute imposed the particular federal requirements in
question on the defendants.118 It thus seems relatively clear that the

110 See id. at 333 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Like
all other Members of the Court, I would not characterize the question before us in terms of
a Supremacy Clause ‘cause of action.’ Rather, I would ask whether ‘federal courts may in
[these] circumstances grant injunctive relief against state officers who are violating, or
planning to violate, federal law.’”) (first quoting id. at 326; and then quoting id. at 339
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
111 Id. at 326.
112 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 838–39 (1824).
113 209 U.S. 123, 150–51 (1908).
114 575 U.S. at 327 (quoting Carroll v. Safford, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 441, 463 (1845)).
115 Id. (citing Louis L. Jaffe & Edith G. Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law:
Historical Origins, 72 L.Q. REV. 345 (1956)).
116 See id. at 331–32.
117 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).
118 The Court’s earlier decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983),
which has often been cited as recognizing a federal right of action to prohibit state officers
from enforcing preempted state regulation, see, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 69, at
745, is completely mysterious as to whether the plaintiff’s ability to obtain relief stems from
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anti-suit injunction in equity, recognized in cases like Osborn and Ex
parte Young, is a freestanding creature not dependent on any legal
cause of action.
Armstrong made clear that any equitable remedy would be subject
to Congress’s power to limit or replace that remedy with an alternate
remedial arrangement.119 Construing Medicaid’s provision implicitly
to foreclose private enforcement, the Court ultimately concluded that
no equitable remedy was available.120 One may or may not agree with
that holding, but the more fundamental problem may well have been
that those traditional remedies generally entailed a prohibitory
injunction preventing the enforcement of an unlawful state measure
against the plaintiff.121 The Armstrong plaintiffs, however, sought an
injunction requiring payment of future reimbursements to plaintiffs at
a higher rate.122 That may have been simply too far outside the
tradition of Osborn, Ex parte Young, or even Shaw for the Court to
stomach.123
In any event, Armstrong—and cases like Ex parte Young and Osborn
before it—seems to contemplate circumstances in which one may have
a grievance that suffices to motivate equitable relief even if one cannot
invoke a legal cause of action. It would amount to much the same
thing to say that one may have an equitable cause of action but not a
legal one. In either case, the nature of the distinction remains a bit
obscure. Professors Bray and Miller say that “[g]rievances recognized
in corrective equity implicate hardships that are difficult to foresee or
define . . . . [and] a wide range of inequities and injustices—in contrast
to the sharply defined and independently actionable causes of action
at common law.”124 This “adjectival” or “second order” aspect of
equity makes it hard to specify in advance the situations in which equity
may provide relief though law cannot.125 But the specific and factual
nature of the predicate for such relief is clear enough. Equitable
grievance, in other words, looks a lot like injury in fact.

the Supremacy Clause, the particular federal statute preempting state law, or some other
source.
119 See 575 U.S. at 327–28.
120 See id. at 328–31.
121 See Harrison, supra note 93, at 1008 (arguing that Ex parte Young “authorized
negative protection from lawsuits, not affirmative relief of a prospective kind”).
122 See 575 U.S. at 324.
123 Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663–65 (1974) (refusing to grant an injunction
to pay money out of the state fisc under Ex parte Young).
124 Bray & Miller, supra note 13, at 1777.
125 See id. at 1782–85; Smith, supra note 15, at 1068–70.
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C. An Equitable Grounding for Injury in Fact
Understanding a grievance in equity as roughly comparable to
standing’s injury in fact may help illumine the central issue in
academic debates about standing, that is, whether the Supreme
Court’s injury-in-fact jurisprudence can be justified. Three aspects of
the equitable grievance confirm its close relationship to factual injury.
First, the circumstances motivating the chancellor to act—“hardships,”
“inequities,” and “injustices,” as Professors Bray and Miller
recount126—derive their force from factual circumstances. Relatedly,
equitable remedies typically require “harm” or “injury,”127 whether or
not that harm need always be irreparable. And more generally, equity
has been described since Aristotle as a “correction of law where it is
defective owing to its universality.”128 As Alexander Hamilton put it
more recently, “[t]he great and primary use of a court of equity is to
give relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules.”129
Equity’s corrective, second-order function would thus seem to depend
on the sort of concrete factual settings that the injury-in-fact
requirement is designed to ensure.
My hypothesis is that if equitable grievances have more to do with
factual injury than with the existence of a legal cause of action, then
the injury-in-fact requirement may make particular sense in equity.
Data Processing articulated its injury-in-fact requirement, after all, in a
suit under the general judicial review provision of the Administrative
Procedure Act, which extends judicial review not only to those
“suffering legal wrong” but also to those “adversely affected or

126 Bray & Miller, supra note 13, at 1777.
127 See Anthony DiSarro, A Farewell to Harms: Against Presuming Irreparable Injury in
Constitutional Litigation, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 745 (2012) (“The history of the
injunctive remedy in this country and in England . . . reflects a consistent and unyielding
view that irreparable injury is an essential element of proof.”); see also Bonaparte v. Camden
& A.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 827 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (No. 1,617) (observing that “the strong
arm of equity . . . never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury”); 1 C.L. BATES,
FEDERAL EQUITY PROCEDURE 148 (1901) (stating that a bill in equity “must show by whom
and in what manner the plaintiffs have been injured”); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY PLEADINGS 9 (John M. Gould ed., 10th ed. 1892) (stating that a bill in equity
“may . . . either complain of some injury” or “complain of a threatened wrong or
impending mischief”). Although the necessity that injury be “irreparable” has been
challenged, see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 4–5
(1991), I do not understand that challenge to deny the need for an injury itself.
128 Bray, supra note 3, at 32 (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 10,
at 1795–96 (J. Barnes ed., W.D. Ross trans., 1984) (c. 384 B.C.E.)), see also Smith, supra note
15, at 1067–71.
129 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

2022]

STANDING, EQUITY, AND INJURY IN FACT

1905

aggrieved by agency action.”130 To be sure, equitable grievances are not
only factual; they have to be the sort of factual injuries that equity courts
see as warranting equitable relief.131 But that is also true of injury in
fact, which must be not only factual but “judicially cognizable”
injury.132 The important point is that while an injury will often “count”
in equity because it arises from an unlawful act, standing does not seem
to depend on the existence of a private right in the plaintiff to bring a
lawsuit.133 Consider again the equitable remedy acknowledged in
Armstrong: in cases where a government official has or is about to
enforce an unconstitutional law against the plaintiff, a court may issue
equitable relief to prevent or remedy that factual wrong—even if there
is no private legal right of action to enforce the federal law that renders
the official’s action unlawful.134 Nor does equity seem always to require
a legal injury; in cases of opportunism, for example, equity may provide
a remedy even in the absence of a legal breach.135
The factual reality or threat of unlawful action against this plaintiff
has generally been a necessary component of their entitlement to the
injunctive remedy. If Article III standing seeks to track traditional
practice, then equity’s expectation of a factual injury—a grievance—is
part of the tradition shaping the contours of an Article III case. And
proposals to reduce Article III’s basic requirement to whether or not
the plaintiff has a legal cause of action must reckon with whether that
framework would be coherent in actions focused on equitable relief.
How, for instance, would a requirement that a plaintiff show a cause of

130 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018) (emphasis added).
131 See Bray & Miller, supra note 13, at 1782 (equitable grievances exist “in relation to
law”).
132 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 n.16 (1974); see
also Stern, supra note 29, at 1184 (arguing that “a grave conceptual difficulty exists in taking
the injury for standing to be injury ‘in fact’ apart from an assessment of the legal quality of
that injury”).
133 If modern standing requirements resemble equitable practice more than the
traditional legal-injury test, derived from the common law forms of action, that might be
because equitable procedures have tended to dominate after the merger in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 7; Laycock, supra note 7, at 64 (“With
the notable exception of jury trial, our procedural rules are mostly derived from equity.”).
I have not attempted to establish any causal influence of equitable procedure on Data
Processing or the injury-in-fact test; my more limited claim is that injury in fact fits well with
an age of public law litigation dominated by requests for equitable relief.
134 This does suggest that it would be a mistake for the Court to extend Armstrong’s
holding that Congress had impliedly excluded equitable relief under the relevant
provisions of the Medicaid statute to a holding that failure to provide a private right of
action in itself impliedly forecloses equitable remedies.
135 See Smith, supra note 15, at 1076.
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action apply to a case like Armstrong, where the claim is grounded in
equitable principles?
It might make sense to ignore equity’s orientation toward factual
rather than legal injury if equitable claims made up only a small
minority of the cases in which standing is at issue. But the striking fact
is that equitable claims compose the overwhelming majority of such
cases, at least in the last half century. A review of all Supreme Court
decisions discussing standing between 1965 and 1995—the key period
for the development of the Court’s injury-in-fact jurisprudence—
reveals that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the remedies sought
were equitable in nature.136 And the familiar landmarks of standing
doctrine—Data Processing, Warth v. Seldin, Allen v. Wright, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife—all involved equitable relief.137 Richard Fallon
thus observed in 2006 that “[s]tanding issues almost never arise in suits
for damages.”138
More recently, some prominent standing cases like Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins,139 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,140 and Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski141
have involved claims for damages relief. Decisions like Spokeo and
TransUnion may herald a new category of cases in which Congress seeks
to regulate certain kinds of private conduct through private-attorneygeneral suits for statutory damages. But most standing cases seem

136 My research assistants reviewed every U.S. Supreme Court decision on standing
between 1965 and 1995 to determine the sort of relief sought. See Memorandum from
Sydney Engle, John Macy & Rebekah Strotman to Author (Jan. 10, 2022) (on file with
author); see also Hessick, supra note 55, at 296 (“Under Chief Justice Burger, the Court again
began to restrict standing in response to courts’ growing use of injunctions to regulate state
and federal governments.”). Many, if not most, cases seeking injunctive relief also sought
a declaratory judgment. Interestingly, a significant proportion of those standing cases that
did involve damages claims were shareholder derivative actions, which the Court has
described as “historically an equitable matter.” Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).
137 One of the plaintiffs in Warth—an organization of homebuilders challenging
exclusionary zoning laws—did allege damages claims (which proved fatal to its claim for
organizational standing). See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975). But all the other
individual plaintiffs and organizations sought injunctive relief. See Ass’n. of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 746–47
(1984); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569 (1992).
138 Fallon, supra note 8, at 650.
139 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (considering whether Congress could confer a right to sue for
statutory damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act on persons about whom the
defendant had posted incorrect information in a credit report).
140 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2208 (2021) (considering standing of members in a class action
seeking damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act).
141 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021) (considering whether a claim to nominal damages could
support a plaintiff’s continuing standing to litigate a challenge to a government policy after
that policy was abandoned).
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likely to remain focused on injunctive relief.142 Standing typically has
to be litigated where the plaintiff’s interest is diffuse, or where they
seek to challenge action happening in the future, and in these cases
injunctive and declaratory relief are likely to be more plausible than
damages awards. Moreover, most standing litigation takes place in
suits challenging government action, where sovereign immunity
doctrines are likely to press plaintiffs toward equitable rather than
legal remedies.143
The predominance of equitable relief is not limited to cases in
which standing is contested but applies to public law litigation
generally. Abram Chayes’ seminal discussion of the public law model
of adjudication, for example, stressed “the increasing importance of
equitable relief.”144 Doug Laycock points out that administrative
litigation, designed to “provide centralized adjudication that bypasses
the ordinary courts” (with their juries), “looks a lot like the
chancellor’s procedure.”145 And again, so many of the great landmarks
of public law litigation—Brown v. Board of Education,146 Roe v. Wade,147
United States v. Virginia,148 District of Columbia v. Heller,149 Obergefell v.
Hodges150—involved claims for injunctive relief. This is unsurprising,
given that only equity can provide the far-reaching relief necessary to
restructure many discriminatory practices or practices that impinge on
basic civil rights.151
What is surprising is that, given the pervasiveness of equity in
public law litigation generally and in standing cases in particular,
current debates about standing have so little to say about how the
142 Uzuegbunam, for example, featured a (nominal) damages claim only because the
original injunctive claim had become moot. See id. at 797.
143 See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that state sovereign immunity
does not bar an action against a state officer for injunctive relief); United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196 (1882) (holding that federal sovereign immunity did not bar a suit against a federal
officer for prospective relief); Laycock, supra note 7, at 63 (citing “immunity rules” as “[t]he
most obvious restrictions on damages”). Professor Laycock also reports what he views to be
“a widespread practice among civil liberties litigators” of avoiding damages claims. Id. at
63–64.
144 Chayes, supra note 39, at 1292; see also OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION
1–6 (1978) (beginning his account of modern civil rights litigation by rejecting the
subordinate status of injunctive relief).
145 Laycock, supra note 7, at 67.
146 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
147 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
148 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
149 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
150 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
151 See Laycock, supra note 7, at 57 (observing that “[i]njunctions are routine in all civil
rights and constitutional litigation” as well as “all environmental litigation”).
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distinctive traditions and practices of equity may bear on standing.
And yet, if I am right that injury in fact closely resembles an equitable
grievance, then our contemporary standing jurisprudence has ended
up at a place that not only reflects historical means of getting into
equity but also accommodates a world of public litigation in which
equitable relief is the norm. Perhaps this is one more instance of the
Court being wiser than the commentators. More likely, it reflects
doctrine’s tendency to be shaped by the context in which it is made.
The injury-in-fact doctrine was crafted overwhelmingly in equity cases,
and it has been shaped by the imperatives, concerns, and needs for
constraint that exist in such cases.
Finally, appreciating the distinctiveness of equity has implications
for those who would overhaul standing jurisprudence. Although
proposed fixes vary, the most prominent proposals have entailed not
so much a return to the legal-injury test as a focus on “whether
Congress (or some other relevant source of law) has created a cause of
action.”152 These proposals rest on a uniquely legal understanding of
standing that may not be so well-adapted for equitable claims.153 Critics
of the Court’s injury-in-fact jurisprudence would do better, I suggest,
to explore the notion of an equitable grievance as an interpretive
guide for what sorts of injury should count.
The Court’s critics might well respond that equity’s traditions
prove only that an injury in fact should be a sufficient condition for
standing—not a necessary one. On this view, Congress should be able
to overcome any objection to a plaintiff’s standing simply by conferring
on that plaintiff a legal cause of action, whether or not that plaintiff
has an injury in fact.154 Given that the contemporary debate has nearly
always focused on the legitimacy of broad statutory “citizens’ suit[]”
provisions enabling suit in the absence of conventional injuries,155 this
conclusion would render any insights gained from traditional equity
practice largely beside the point. This way of thinking about the
problem raises several difficulties, however.
First, the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons156
has been understood to hold that “a plaintiff must demonstrate

152 Sunstein, supra note 12, at 222; see also Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge
Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974).
Others would require both a legal injury and a cause of action. See Sierra v. City of Hallandale
Beach, 996 F.3d 1110, 1122 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J., concurring).
153 Bray & Miller, supra note 13, at 1799 (“[T]o insist on an equitable cause of action
is to work a fundamental change in how a plaintiff gets into equity.”).
154 See Sunstein, supra note 52, at 18–19.
155 See id. at 11–13; see also supra text accompanying notes 46–51.
156 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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standing separately for each form of relief sought.”157 I have my doubts
about the Lyons rule, both as an interpretation of Article III and as a
reading of what actually happened in that case.158 But if Lyons holds,
then many public law plaintiffs might lack standing to seek equitable
relief even if we assume that a legal cause of action suffices to confer
standing to seek equitable relief.159
Second, even if one does not accept the Lyons rule, it may be
appropriate to read most federal statutes providing for damages
against the background of traditional requirements for such relief.160
Such statutes should not, in other words, ordinarily be construed to
confer a private right of action to seek equitable relief on persons
lacking an equitable—that is, factual—grievance.
Finally, and most fundamentally, the general requirement of
factual injury for equitable relief ought to change the discussion about
the content of Article III’s limitation on appropriate parties. Generally
speaking, the Court’s critics have not challenged the Court’s vision of
Article III as limited to “cases and controversies of the sort traditionally
amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.”161 They have simply
insisted that injury in fact has no basis in that tradition and that the
relevant history is the old legal-injury rule. Acknowledging equity’s
tradition of factual injury, however, would require critics to explain
why the tradition at law should be controlling. Any such explanation
faces an uphill climb, given the prevalence of equitable relief in
modern standing cases, the extent to which signature aspects of
modern public law draw on equitable roots, and the general “triumph
157 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185
(2000) (citing Lyons for this proposition). No such statement occurs in Lyons itself.
158 On the latter point, it is surely crucial that Mr. Lyons had agreed to sever his
damages claim from his claim for injunctive relief so as to permit the City to appeal the
district court’s injunction while the damages action remained pending in the trial court.
See 461 U.S. at 105 n.6; see also Graudins v. Retro Fitness, LLC, 921 F. Supp. 2d 456, 468
(E.D. Pa. 2013) (“Severance pursuant to Rule 21 essentially creates a separate case, the
disposition of which is final and appealable.”)
159 One might also, of course, dispute the claim that a cause of action necessarily does
suffice to create standing even for legal actions. See, e.g., Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note
24, at 691.
160 See, e.g., Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1942 (2020) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993)) (“In interpreting statutes . . . that provide for ‘equitable relief,’
this Court analyzes whether a particular remedy falls into ‘those categories of relief that
were typically available in equity.’”); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946)
(“When Congress leaves to the federal courts the formulation of remedial details, it can
hardly expect them to break with historic principles of equity in the enforcement of
federally-created equitable rights.”).
161 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000) )
(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)).
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of equity” in many aspects of modern civil practice. To graft a legal
cause-of-action test for standing onto broad citizen-suit provisions with
expansive equitable remedies would not amount simply to choosing
one tradition over another. Rather, it would maximize the power of
equitable remedies while leaving their limits behind.
Courts might, instead, embrace equity’s tradition of adaptation
over time to fill whatever gaps develop in legal options for preventing
injustice.162 From this standpoint, we might consider injury in fact as a
sort of equitable correction for the potential of broad “public actions”
to intrude on values of separation of powers, federalism, and other
interests. In any event, it is hard to justify ignoring altogether the
traditions on the equity side of the house—including the limits those
traditions impose on judicial power.
CONCLUSION
Our law interprets Article III’s bare-bones language in light of
traditional practices about how lawsuits are structured and proceed.
But our view of those practices has often overlooked the distinctive
character of equity. In particular, the absence of causes of action in
equity, and the centrality of grievances rather than legal rights, ought
to inform our view of standing—especially since so many standing
cases involve equitable relief. Happily, we have somehow arrived at a
basic predicate for standing—injury in fact—that seems basically
similar to the grievance necessary for getting into equity. If that is
right, then equity may help us better ground our current doctrine and
answer some of the questions that remain.

162 See Bray & Miller, supra note 13, at 1795 (emphasizing that “equity cannot be
static”).

